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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”), based 
at Seattle University School of Law, advances justice through research, advocacy, and 
education.  Currently, the Korematsu Center is making ongoing efforts to study the racial 
disproportionality that exists within our criminal justice system.  The Korematsu Center 
does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (“AACAP”) is a 
medical membership association established by child and adolescent psychiatrists in 
1953.  Now over 8,700 members strong, AACAP is the leading national medical 
association dedicated to treating and improving the quality of life for the estimated 7-15 
million American youth under 18 years of age who are affected by emotional, behavioral, 
developmental and mental disorders.  AACAP’s members actively research, evaluate, 
diagnose, and treat psychiatric disorders, and pride themselves on giving direction to and 
responding quickly to new developments in addressing the health care needs of children 
and their families. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing 
juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide offenses constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  560 U.S. 48 (2010).  The Court reasoned that youth are less culpable than 
adults because of biological difference in brain development that render youth more 
immature, more likely to engage in risky behavior, and more vulnerable to external 
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 2 
developing well into late adolescence, the Court determined that their personality traits 
are more transient and capable of change than adult personalities.  Id. at 68-69.  The 
undisputed scientific data confirms that youth cannot be expected to act as mature adults. 
The Supreme Court clarified and extended the Graham decision in Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  There, the Court found that because youth offenders 
were less culpable due to the characteristics noted in Graham, imposing mandatory life 
sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Graham and 
Miller mandate that when sentencing youth offenders, a court must consider as mitigating 
factors the characteristics that make youth offenders different. 
The Petitioner’s sentence must be vacated because, pursuant to the Graham and 
Miller framework, youth offenders are less culpable and are entitled to a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  In addition to concluding that Miller may be applied 
retroactively, amici respectfully request that the Court provide guidance to the lower 
courts on how to apply Missouri sentencing statutes in a constitutional fashion so that 
youth offenders have the opportunity to seek parole and become productive members of 
society.  Providing this constitutionally-mandated opportunity is especially important 





























I. Medical Research on Brain Development Confirms That Youth Offenders 
Under 18 Years of Age Are Categorically Different From Adult Offenders With 
Regard to Culpability, Susceptibility to Deterrence, Vulnerability to Peer Pressure, 
and Capacity to Change. 
A youth’s mind is different.  Science, law, and social values have all recognized 
this essential fact.  In Roper v. Simmons, Graham, and Miller, the Court recognized that a 
youth’s culpability “is diminished, to a substantial degree” based on biological 
differences between a youth’s brain and an adult’s brain.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 571 (2005) (emphasis added).  These biological distinctions have long been 
recognized by common-sense and ratified by our society’s laws which “recognize[] a host 
of distinctions between the rights and duties of children and those of adults.”  New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 n.2 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).1 
                                                  
1 For example, Missouri has enacted numerous protective laws to keep youth from 
purchasing, using, or possessing certain substances or items.  See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
311.325 (prohibiting persons under twenty-one years of age from purchasing or 
possessing alcohol); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.931 (prohibiting minors from purchasing or 
obtaining tobacco products).  Further, the state has categorically barred minors from 
playing in authorized gambling activities.  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 572.020.  Similarly, minors 
are limited in their ability to contract, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 431.056, or even mark their bodies 
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 4 
These judicially and legislatively recognized distinctions are based on three 
categorical differences that separate youths from adults: (1) a propensity to engage in 
risky behavior; (2) a susceptibility to external pressures; and (3) a transient personality 
with a penchant for change.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 71-76.  “Juveniles’ susceptibility to 
immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.’”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted).  Science 
now verifies what law and common sense have always known to be true: because youth 
minds are different, youth offenders must be treated differently than adult offenders.2 
A. Because Youth Brains Are Structurally Hardwired in Ways That 
Promote Risky and Impulsive Behavior, Adult Sanctions Do Not Deter 
Youth Misconduct. 
The notion that youth, as a group, are prone to impulsive behavior is not simply a 
stereotype.  Indeed, various studies have confirmed that youth “exhibit a disproportionate 
                                                                                                                                                                
Federal law also recognizes youth incompetency in certain activities.  Under 
10 U.S.C. § 505(a), a person must be eighteen to serve in the military without parental 
consent.  Federal law also prohibits, with certain exceptions, persons under the age of 
eighteen from possessing a handgun or handgun ammunition.  18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), (5). 
2 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 
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 5 
amount of reckless behavior, sensation seeking and risk taking.”3  In fact, across cultures, 
developmental psychiatrists have found that reckless and sensation seeking behavior 
peaks during adolescence.4  This behavior often involves criminal activities such as drunk 
driving and drug use, and reckless conduct such as unprotected sex.5  In particular, 
violent crimes “peak sharply” in late adolescence (ages 16 and 17).6  This is due, in part, 
because youth overvalue rewards and minimize risks, thereby skewing their cost calculus 
                                                  
3 Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 
24 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 417, 421 n.1 (2000). 
4 Beatrice Luna, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in 
FROM ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 250 (Francisco Aboitiz & 
Diego Cosmelli, eds.) (2009). 
5 “[I]n laboratory experiments and studies across a wide range of adolescent populations, 
developmental psychologists [have shown] that adolescents are risk takers who inflate the 
benefits of crime and sharply discount its consequences, even when they know the law.”  
Jeffrey Fagan, Why Science and Development Matter in Juvenile Justice, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2005, at 2. 
6 Terrie Moffit, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A 
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 6 
when making decisions.7  The overvaluing of rewards has been observed to be 
particularly pronounced when youth are interacting with other adolescents.8 
Recent brain imaging studies have found a biological link between risk-taking 
behavior and pre-frontal brain development.9  In particular, youth brains show increased 
neural activity in parts of the brain linked to risky behavior,10 and less activity in the 
prefrontal cortex, which continues to mature through late adolescence.11  Prefrontal 
cortex maturation is especially important when gauging youth culpability because that 
                                                  
7 Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 16:3 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL.  47, 57 (2009) [hereinafter "Steinberg 2009"]. 
8 Laurence Steinberg.  Does Recent Research on Adolescent Brain Development Inform 
the Mature Minor Doctrine?  38.3 J. MED. & PHIL. 256, 260 (2013). 
9 James Bjork et al., Developmental Differences in Posterior Mesofrontal Cortex 
Recruitment by Risky Rewards, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 4839 (2007). 
10 Robert Shepherd, The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Justice, 19 CRIM. 
JUST. 51, 52 (2005) ("[T]here are clear neurological explanations for the difficulties 
adolescents have in cognitive functioning, in exercising mature judgment, in controlling 
impulses, in weighing the consequences of actions, in resisting the influence of peers, and 
in generally becoming more responsible."). 
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 7 
part of the brain is associated with decision making generally,12 including making moral 
judgments13 and evaluating future consequences.14  Moreover, the ability to regulate 
one’s emotions – a crucial element of behavior control15 – does not fully develop until 
post-adolescence.16 
As a result, youth brains develop with a structural imbalance that effectively 
promotes poor decision making: the areas that motivate reckless behavior mature sooner 
than the areas that regulate such behavior.17  Put simply, the youth brain is literally hard-
wired to promote poor decision making.  Because youth brains are biologically less 
                                                  
12 Samantha B. Wright et al., Neural Correlates of Fluid Reasoning in Children and 
Adults, 1:8 FRONTIERS HUM NEUROSCI. 7 (2008) (prefrontal cortex controls 
reasoning). 
13 Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral 
Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ 
NEURO-PSQUIATR 657 (2001). 
14 Antoine Bechera et al., Characterization of the Decision-Making Deficit of Patients 
with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2189-99 (2000). 
15 Sang Hee Kim & Stephan Hamann, Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative 
Emotion Regulation, 19:5 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 776, 776 (2007). 
16 Casey, supra note 11, at 65. 
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 8 
“capable” of regulating their behavior,18 “[i]t is statistically aberrant to refrain from such 
[risk-taking] behavior during adolescence.”19 
Additionally, experience and scientific research confirm that long sentences such 
as life without parole do nothing to deter youth offenders because their limited life 
experiences make it difficult for them to weigh consequences and perceive long stretches 
of time.20  Indeed, “Roper noted that ‘the same characteristics that render juveniles less 
                                                  
18 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (lm)Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: 
Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 742 
(2000). 
19 Spear, supra note 3.  See also Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A 
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 344 (1992) (noting that 
over half of youth reported driving drunk, using drugs, engaging in other criminal acts). 
20 “Few adolescents are likely to be able to grasp the true significance of a life sentence.  
One twenty-nine-year-old woman serving life without parole told a researcher for this 
report that when she was sentenced, at the age of sixteen:  ‘I didn't understand “life 
without” ... [that] to have “life without,” you were locked down forever.  You know it 
really dawned on me when [after several years in prison, a journalist] came and ... he 
asked me, “Do you realize that you’re gonna be in prison for the rest of your life?”  And I 
said, “Do you really think that?  You know ... and I was like, “For the rest of my life?  Do 
you think that God will leave me in prison for the rest of my life?’”  Human Rights 
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 9 
culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”  
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571); see also Miller, 132 S.Ct. 
at 2465.21  In one study, researchers found that the threat of adult sanctions had no 
deterrent effect whatsoever on youth crime.22  In sum, there is a strong biological basis 
for the notion that youth offenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts. 
B. Youth Are Particularly Vulnerable to External Pressures at Home and 
From Peers. 
Another reason youth are less culpable than adults is because they are uniquely 
susceptible to negative external influences and peer pressure.  First, youth are not old 
enough to control or remove themselves from negative environments, which can 
undermine decision making.  In particular, youth are “dependent on living circumstances 
of their parents and families and hence are vulnerable to the impact of conditions well 
                                                  
21 “Because juveniles’ lack of maturity and under-developed sense of responsibility ... 
often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,” Johnson v. Texas, 509 
U.S. 350, 367 (1993), they are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration 
when making decisions. This is particularly so when that punishment is rarely imposed.”  
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29. 
22 Eric L. Jensen & Linda Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver 
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beyond their control.”23  Put differently, youth are not old enough to “extricate 
themselves from a criminogenic setting.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see also id. (noting 
that “juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape 
negative influences in their whole environment”). 
Second, youth brains are more sensitive to certain emotional triggers, such as fear, 
rejection, and the desire to “fit in,” making them particularly vulnerable to peer 
pressure.24  In fact, the parts of the brain associated with resistance to peer influence are 
still developing well into late adolescence.25  One study found that peer pressure doubles 
risky behavior, including criminal behavior, among youth.26  Peer pressure can be 
especially pronounced in the gang context, where the data indicate enormous group 
                                                  
23 Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision making of 
Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 33 (Thpmas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz, 
eds., 2000). 
24 Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer 
Pressure, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1536-38 (2007). 
25 Steinberg 2009, supra note 7, at 56. 
26 Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking. Risk Preference 
and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 
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pressure exists to engage in self destructive behavior.27  Indeed, the mere presence of 
other teens can directly influence adolescents’ decisions and actions.28  It is no 
coincidence that most youth crime is group youth crime.29 
Together, these two vulnerabilities – an inability to control their external 
environment and a susceptibility to peer pressure – combine to make youth less culpable.  
These pressures were particularly salient for the four Petitioners.  Petitioner Griffin was 
beaten by his stepfather and went through 13 schools in 11 years.  Petitioner McElroy 
grew up in a violent environment of gangs and suffered from abuse at home.  Petitioner 
Lockhart also grew up surrounded by gang violence and had his house sprayed with 
                                                  
27 See Michele Mouttapa et al., I'm Mad and I'm Bad: Links Between Self-Identification 
as a Gangster, Symptoms of Anger, and Alcohol Use Among Minority Juvenile Offenders, 
8 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUVENILE J. 71 (2010) (finding that identifying with a “gang 
member peer group” increases the likelihood of destructive behavior such as heavy 
alcohol use). 
28 Alexandra O. Cohen and B. J. Casey. Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of 
Developmental Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18.2 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 63, 65 
(2014). 
29 Franklin Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON 
TRIAL 281 (2000) (“No matter the crime, if a teenager is the offender, he is usually not 
committing the offense alone.”); Moffit, supra note 5, at 686-88 (finding a strong 
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bullets when he was 16 years old.  Petitioner Collier experienced peer pressure in 
assisting a friend to scare the friend’s parole officer.  Long before the Petitioners became 
prisoners in the Missouri Department of Corrections, they were trapped in environments 
they could not shape or escape.  These environments profoundly affect the calculus of 
culpability. 
C. The Same Factors That Make Youth Less Culpable Than Adults Also 
Make Them More Capable of Change.  Life Sentences Without Parole 
Fail to Recognize This Potential For Rehabilitation. 
“[I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (internal 
citation omitted). Adolescence is a time of remarkable change and transience, when youth 
are still struggling to form a basic identity.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (noting that “[t]he 
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed” than those of adults).  Youth 
crime reflects this transient period and is one of the “qualities of youth” itself, rather than 
a sign of an intractably bad character.  Id.  Although violent crime peaks around 16 and 
17 years, it “drop[s] precipitously in to young adulthood.”30  In fact, developmental 
psychiatrists have found that the vast majority of youth offenders will stop committing 
crime once they are adults,31 and very few youth offenders develop intractable or long 
term problems with criminality.32 This capacity for change is a crucial distinction 
                                                  
30 Moffit, supra note 5, at 675. 
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between youth offenders and adult offenders.  “From a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility 
exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).  
Youth characteristics are so malleable that “[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”  Id. at 73 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).  If trained 
psychiatrists cannot distinguish between those rare youth offenders who are incorrigible 
from the majority who are capable of change, then surely trial judges (and prosecutors) 
cannot do so either.33  “The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity 
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of [an] irretrievably depraved character.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  
Echoing its reasoning in Roper, the Court made clear in Graham and Miller that there is 
no reliable way – either for a prosecutor or a sentencing judge – to determine when a 
youth offender's crimes are the result of “irreparable corruption,” and no reliable way to 
                                                  
33 In fact, vexed researchers have found that those youth offenders who change and those 
who continue committing crimes exhibit identical behavior at the outset, making it 
impossible to identify incorrigible offenders.  Edward Mulvey & Elizabeth Cauffman, 
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conclude that a youth offender ought to die in prison.  Sentencing the Petitioners to life 
sentences, therefore, cannot rest on the assumption that they are irredeemably depraved.   
Additionally, because youth have such tremendous capacity for change and 
rehabilitation, Roper and Graham emphasized that youth offenders should not be given 
irreversible sentences.  Life without parole sentences “share some characteristics with 
death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.  Like 
the death penalty, a life without parole sentence “does not even purport to serve a 
rehabilitative function.”  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1028 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).34  Additionally, like the death penalty, these life sentences are irreversible 
because the years Petitioners will serve can never be returned, and their sentences can 
only end with death.35  This sentence, like the death sentence, effectively condemns 
Petitioners to die in prison whether or not they demonstrate what most youth offenders 
eventually demonstrate: a matured moral character that warrants a second chance.  In this 
way, a life without parole sentence “deprives children of both any hope for return to 
                                                  
34 Notably, the United States Supreme Court explicitly found in Miller that Harmelin did 
not preclude the Court’s holding that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate 
the Eighth Amendment. 
35 “The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the 
sentences alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the 
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society and any opportunity for rehabilitation.”36  The remote possibility of gubernatorial 
clemency does not change this calculus.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (“the remote possibility 
of [executive clemency] does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence”). 
Given that the vast majority of youth offenders do change, and that judges cannot 
predict whether they will not, the Court in Miller opted for a categorical rule against 
mandatory life without parole sentences for youth offenders, even for first-degree murder 
convictions.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.  The Petitioners’ life sentences under Missouri’s 
statute directly conflict with the Court’s holding in Miller, and must therefore be vacated. 
II. Given the Court’s Holding in Miller, this Court Should Find Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 565.020 Unconstitutional as Applied to Juveniles, and Find That Petitioners Must 
be Resentenced With Miller’s Considerations Explicitly Taken Into Account. 
A. For Graham and Miller to be Given Constitutional Effect, Miller Must 
be Applied Retroactively and Petitioners Should be Resentenced. 
Graham and Miller make clear that juveniles must have a meaningful opportunity 
for release.  Petitioners have never received one, and Miller must be applied retroactively 
to give Petitioners this opportunity.  Only by applying Miller retroactively will 
Petitioners ever receive a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain release as required by the 
United States Constitution.   
                                                  
36 Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment 
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Although the United States Supreme Court did not directly address retroactivity in 
Miller, its disposition of the consolidated companion case of Kuntrell Jackson 
demonstrates that it intended its decision to be retroactive.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461-62.  
As with the Petitioners here, Jackson’s conviction was final, but after the Arkansas 
Supreme Court affirmed his convictions, “Jackson filed a state petition for habeas 
corpus.”  Id. at 2461.  The Supreme Court granted relief to Jackson, reversing the 
decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and remanding for an individualized 
resentencing allowing “a judge or jury [to] have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”  Id. at 2475. 
If Miller were not retroactive, Jackson could not have obtained this relief.  A “new 
rule becomes retroactive…simply by the action of the Supreme Court.”  Tyler v. Cain, 
533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).  Further, Miller rested directly on the Court’s prior decisions in 
Roper and Graham, both of which have been found to be retroactive.  Because Jackson 
obtained relief from the Supreme Court on collateral review, Miller applies retroactively 
to all individuals seeking review after their convictions have become final.  See Tyler v. 
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 668-669 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“[I]f we hold in Case One that a 
particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case 
Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given 
rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.”). 
Amici will not rehash the Petitioners’ detailed analysis regarding the retroactive 
application of Miller.  It is worth noting, however, that in announcing Miller, the 
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different from adult offenders.  A finding that Miller is not retroactive would deny 
Petitioners a meaningful opportunity to obtain release by demonstrating their capacity for 
rehabilitation.  For example, Petitioner Griffin has completed numerous programs while 
incarcerated and has demonstrated the capacity for rehabilitation recognized in the 
scientific research.  Petitioner Lockhart has successfully completed his GED, become 
vice-president of a hospice program, and completed numerous other vocational and 
behavioral courses.  Most significantly, Petitioner Lockhart has removed himself from 
the gang violence of his past and founded an anti-gang program (“Critical Change”) 
while incarcerated. 
Principles of justice and fairness demand that Petitioners receive a hearing on their 
capacity for rehabilitation because “children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
B. Principles of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation Require a 
Finding That Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020 is Unconstitutional as Applied to 
Juveniles, and the Appropriate Remedy is For Petitioners to be 
Resentenced. 
The United States Supreme Court has “held on multiple occasions that a 
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2470 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48).  Because Missouri Revised 
Statute § 565.020 mandates that anyone, including a child, who is convicted of 
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unconstitutional as applied to children.  See id. at 2460.  Therefore, this Court should 
vacate Petitioners’ sentences and remand for constitutionally-mandated resentencing. 
Section 565.020 provides:  
1. A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if he knowingly 
causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter. 
2. Murder in the first degree is a class A felony, and the punishment shall 
be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or 
parole, or release except by act of the governor;… 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020. 
Here, the only possible sentence for Petitioners under the statute was a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole.  “The trial court only may impose a sentence 
that is authorized by law and…the only sentence authorized by section 556.020 [sic] 
when a juvenile is found guilty of first-degree murder is life without parole.”  State v. 
Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Mo. 2013).  In State v. Hart, a case on direct appeal, this 
Court explained that Miller requires an individualized sentencing assessment before a 
court could impose a life sentence pursuant to section 565.020.  Id. at 239. 
On remand, if the sentencer conducts the individualized assessment 
required by Miller and is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
sentencing Hart to life in prison without parole is just and appropriate under 
all the circumstances, the trial court must impose that sentence.  If the 
sentencer is not persuaded that this sentence is just and appropriate, section 
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constitutionally permissible punishment.  In that event, Hart cannot be 
convicted of first-degree murder and the trial court must find him guilty of 
second-degree murder instead. 
Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 235, 239 (emphasis added).   
Petitioners here did not receive an individualized sentencing assessment and, 
therefore, under Miller and Hart, the appropriate remedy for Petitioners is to have their 
prior sentences vacated and be resentenced on remand.  Pursuant to Hart, if the lower 
courts do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that a life sentence for Petitioners is just and 
appropriate, then the sentence of life imprisonment without parole under section 565.020 
is unconstitutional and void as to Petitioners.  Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242.  The lower courts 
must then enter a new finding that Petitioners are guilty of second-degree murder under 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.021, and resentence them pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.011.1(1).  
Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242-43.37   
In the resentencing, “the trial court should instruct the jury, before it begins its 
deliberations, that if it is not persuaded [beyond a reasonable doubt] that life without 
parole is a just and appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of the case, 
                                                  
37 Second-degree murder under section 565.021.1(1) is a lesser-included offense of first-
degree murder.  Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242, n.8h.  Second-degree murder convictions 
provide for a sentencing range of 10 to 30 years or life with the possibility of parole.  Mo. 
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additional instructions concerning applicable punishments” and the possibility of lesser 
sentences can then be considered at that time.  Id. at 242.   
Further, this Court should explicitly direct the lower courts to consider the 
following factors under Miller as to whether a life sentence is just and appropriate: (1) 
minors have substantially lessened culpability than adults; (2) minors are more prone to 
risky and reckless behavior than adults; (3) cognitive processes are substantially 
diminished in minors compared to adults; (4) minors are especially susceptible to peer 
pressure and negative environments in committing crimes; and (5) minors have a greater 
capacity for change and rehabilitation than adult offenders.  Given the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “doubt[s] [about] the penological justifications for imposing life without parole 
on juveniles, Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466, only this approach will give Miller constitutional 
effect so as to provide juvenile offenders individualized sentencing.  Without clear 
direction to consider these key “mitigating qualities of youth,” Petitioners will not 
actually receive an individualized sentencing as mandated by the Supreme Court that 
considers the factors critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis.  See id., 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 
2470. 
Clear direction to lower courts as to the procedure and relevant factors for 
resentencing the Petitioners will prevent confusion in the lower courts, promote efficient 
judicial administration, and allow for the goals of Miller to be effectuated.  See State v. 
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (endorsing effective administration of justice 





























“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.  It is a time and condition of life when 
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”  Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).  Thirty-two years after Eddings, scientific research 
confirms that youth offenders cannot be expected to think or behave like adults.  
Recognizing these differences, the Supreme Court articulated a rule that youth offenders 
must receive an individualized sentencing that considers the factors explored in Miller.   
The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee that Petitioners will not spend their 
lives in prison, but it does forbid statutory schemes that make the judgment at the outset, 
whether that judgment was made for youths in the past or going forward.  Because 
Petitioners never received an opportunity to present mitigating factors, show their 
potential for rehabilitation, or have the Miller factors considered, their sentences must be 
vacated, with direction to resentence pursuant to the factors discussed herein.   
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